DHS v. D.V.D.: The Supreme Court’s Shadow-Docket Stay of the Murphy Injunction
- Citation
- Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., 606 U.S. ___ (2025) (No. 24A1153)
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Decided
- June 23, 2025; July 3, 2025 (clarification)
- Statute
- INA §§ 240, 241(a)(5); 5 U.S.C. § 705 (stay pending appeal); CAT regulations
- Holding
- PI stayed pending appellate review (no opinion June 23); July 3 clarification (7-2): stay applies to the eight migrants then held at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, clearing the way for their removal to South Sudan.
The Supreme Court’s June 23, 2025 order in DHS v. D.V.D. arrived without an opinion. The Court granted the government’s application to stay Judge Murphy’s preliminary injunction pending the First Circuit’s decision on the merits. Three Justices — Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson — dissented; the dissent did not explain the dissent.
The decision’s mechanics became clear in the days that followed. ICE took the position that the stay reached not only the underlying policy but the specific persons — the eight men held at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti — whom the PI had previously protected. Plaintiffs sought clarification. On July 3, 2025, by a 7-2 vote, the Court confirmed that the stay covered the Djibouti detainees. They were removed to South Sudan on July 4, 2025.
Sotomayor’s dissent
The July 3 clarification produced what is, in the modern era, an unusually pointed dissent. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, wrote that “in matters of life and death, it is best to proceed with caution” and characterized the Court’s order as “so gross an abuse of the Court’s equitable discretion as to be indistinguishable from rewarding lawlessness.” The Government had violated Judge Murphy’s PI; the Court was now permitting it to consummate the violation.
The dissent invoked the Court’s emergency-docket pattern over the prior eighteen months: a series of orders favoring the Executive in immigration cases, often without opinion, often on uncertain facts, often with practical consequences that would be difficult or impossible to undo. “Thousands will suffer violence in farflung locales,” the dissent warned, “to vindicate the Government’s view that it is unconstrained by law.”
“In matters of life and death, it is best to proceed with caution.”
The procedural posture
It bears emphasizing that the Court’s order did not adjudicate the merits. Whether the third-country removal policy is in fact unlawful remains the question on the First Circuit appeal of Judge Murphy’s February 2026 final judgment. The June 23 stay, however, produced a striking operational consequence: removals resumed; advance notice and CAT screening, which had been required by the PI, ceased to be required as a federal-court matter. The constitutional regime governing third-country removal returned, in substance, to whatever the executive chose to implement.
Significance
The Court’s decision in DHS v. D.V.D. is now widely cited as a defining example of the modern shadow docket’s practical reach. The lack of an opinion, the immediate operational consequence, the emergency-application posture, and the Court’s willingness to enter relief on a contested factual record all reflect features that have made the shadow docket a target of academic and political criticism.
For habeas practice, the case has two distinct effects. First, it confirms that the Supreme Court will, in the right posture, intervene aggressively in favor of executive removal authority. Second, it makes the district-court forum — particularly forums like the District of Massachusetts that have shown willingness to enforce notice and procedural protections — even more important than they were before. With Supreme Court intervention available to the government on emergency applications, the durability of any habeas relief depends on building the strongest possible district-court record.
Filed under Third-Country Removal. Published June 23, 2025 (stay); July 3, 2025 (clarification).