Black v. Almodovar: The Second Circuit Reaffirms Its Prolonged-Detention Framework
- Citation
- Black v. Almodovar, Nos. 20-3224, 22-70 (2d Cir. Oct. 24, 2025) (order denying rehearing en banc)
- Court
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- Decided
- October 24, 2025
- Statute
- 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
- Holding
- Rehearing en banc denied, leaving Black v. Decker in place: after prolonged § 1226(c) detention, an individualized bond hearing at which the government bears the burden by clear and convincing evidence. Judges Nardini and Menashi dissented; Senior Judges Chin and Carney, members of the panel, filed a statement supporting the denial.
By the autumn of 2025, the government was asking the full Second Circuit to rehear Black v. Decker. Its petition, decided under a caption that substituted Acting Field Office Director Judith Almodovar as respondent, raised, in Judge Nardini’s words, “two principal issues”: whether and when due process limits detention without a bond hearing under § 1226(c), and, “if such a hearing is required, which party bears the burden of proof and under what standard.”
On October 24, 2025, the Second Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc. Black v. Almodovar is that order, together with the separate writings it drew: Judge Lohier, joined by six colleagues, concurred in the denial; Judge Nardini, joined by Chief Judge Livingston and Judges Sullivan, Park and Menashi, dissented, as did Judge Menashi, joined by Chief Judge Livingston and Judges Sullivan and Park; and Senior Judges Chin and Carney, members of the original panel, filed a statement supporting the denial.
The “definite termination point” argument
Judge Menashi’s dissent pressed the most categorical argument: Supreme Court decisions, he wrote, “establish that (1) a detention under § 1226(c) has a definite termination point, so it does not implicate the due process concerns associated with indefinite detention.” Senior Judges Chin and Carney answered that under that reading “no individual could ever challenge his or her detention under § 1226(c), even if the detention became indefinite or, worse, permanent.”
The Mathews framework, restated
The Chin–Carney statement retraced the panel’s Mathews v. Eldridge analysis: applying the three-factor test to each detainee’s circumstances, the panel had held that detention had become unreasonably prolonged, and that at the resulting bond hearing “due process demanded that the government bear the burden to justify, by clear and convincing evidence, their continued detentions.” Judge Nardini’s dissent would instead have required the detainee to justify release by a preponderance of the evidence.
“Absent a court’s imposition of a life sentence for a criminal conviction, due process does not permit such a result.”
Significance
Black v. Almodovar matters for two reasons. First, it leaves the Second Circuit’s position in place against renewed government attack. Second, the Chin–Carney statement answers the “definite termination point” argument directly, framing the dispute for any Supreme Court review of the prolonged-detention question.
For practitioners, the denial leaves the clear-and-convincing-evidence rule in place for prolonged detention under both § 1226(c) (Black) and § 1226(a) (Velasco Lopez) in the Second Circuit. The framework is now uniform across the circuit’s detention docket, and the government bears the burden in every prolonged-detention bond hearing the courts of the Second Circuit order.
Filed under Pre-Removal Detention. Published October 24, 2025.